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Abstract
We establish the Ahlswede dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channels, i.e., either the deterministic secrecy capacity
of the channel is zero, or it equals its randomness-assisted secrecy capacity.
We analyze the secrecy capacity of these channels when the sender and
the receiver use various resources. It turns out that randomness, common
randomness, and correlation as resources are very helpful for achieving
a positive secrecy capacity. We prove the phenomenon “super-activation”
for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, i.e., two chan-
nels, both with zero deterministic secrecy capacity, if used together allow
perfect secure transmission.
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1 Introduction
The developments in modern communication systems are rapid. Especially quan-
tum communication systems allow us to exploit new possibilities while at the
same time imposing fundamental limitations. Quantum information processing
systems provide huge theoretical advantages over their classical counterparts,
one of the two most prominent ones being perfect secrecy (cf. [10] and [9] for
two well-known examples of quantum key distributions). The impact of quan-
tum information processing systems on our daily live is nonetheless still zero,
the main reason for that being the difficulty to store and manipulate quantum
states in a predictable and reliable manner.
In this work, we bring these two aspects together, namely we investigate
the transmission of messages from a sending to a receiving party. The messages
ought to be kept secret from an eavesdropper. Communication takes place over a
quantum channel which is, in addition to noise from the environment, subjected
to the action of a jammer which actively manipulates the states.
Preceding work in quantum information theory has mostly focused on either
of the two attacks. Our goal is to deliver a more general theory considering both
channel robustness and security in quantum information theory. By doing so,
we build on the preceding works [15] and [18]. Furthermore, we are interested
in the delivery of large volumes of messages over many channel uses, so that we
study the asymptotic behavior of the system.
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Our work fits into a broader range of recent work in both classical and quan-
tum information theory [37, 20, 17, 15, 12, 19, 23, 27, 29, 30] that studies the
secret information processing tasks with the aim of delivering embedded secu-
rity: Unlike what is nowadays the standard approach in secret communication,
namely to first ensure the successful transmission of messages and then im-
plement a cryptographic protocol on top whose security relies on assumptions
concerning the difficulties in breaking the protocol, this new paradigm focuses
on delivering a guaranteed security right from the start. The security features
of the protocol become embedded already at the physical layer of the commu-
nication system. The concept does not only cover secure message transmission
but also secure key generation.
Also, communication models including a jammer that tries to prevent the
legal parties from communicating properly have received a great lot of atten-
tion in recent years, some of which we have already mentioned above include
wiretapping aspects, while some do not [6]. These publications concentrated on
the model of an arbitrarily varying channel where the jammer may change his
input in every channel use and is not restricted to use a repetitive probabilistic
strategy. Quite on the contrary, it is understood that the sender and the receiver
have to select their coding scheme first. After that the jammer makes his choice
of the channel state. The model of an arbitrarily varying channel was first intro-
duced by Blackwell, Breiman, and Thomasian in [14]. The nature of the model
is quite flexible: It allows specifying the impact that the actions of the jammer
may have on the communication link under use: In the most restrictive case
where the jammer is left with only one choice, we recover the discrete memory-
less channel. On the other extreme, it has been shown by Ahlswede in [1] that
the capacity (under maximal error criterion) of certain arbitrarily varying chan-
nels can be equated to the zero-error capacity of related discrete memoryless
channels. The arbitrarily varying channel does at the same time demonstrate
the importance of shared randomness for communication in a very clear form:
Ahlswede showed in [3] (cf. also [4] and [5]) the surprising result that either the
deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying channel is zero, or it equals its
shared randomness-assisted capacity (this effect is now known as the Ahlswede
dichotomy). After that discovery, it remained an open question exactly when
the deterministic capacity is nonzero. In [24] Ericson gave a sufficient condition
for that, and in [22] Csiszár and Narayan proved that this is condition is also
necessary.
In this work, we will therefore put a focus on the analysis of different forms of
shared randomness and their impact on the robustness and security. The model
of a wiretap channel adds a third party to the communication problem as well,
but here the focus is on secure communication, meaning communication without
that third party getting to know the messages. This model was first introduced
by Wyner in [40] (in this paper we will use a stronger security criterion than the
one that was used in [40], cf. Remark 2.9). The relation of the different security
criteria is discussed, e.g. in [16] with some generality and in [37] with respect to
arbitrarily varying channels.
In the model of an arbitrarily varying wiretap channel, we consider trans-
mission with both a jammer and an eavesdropper. Its secrecy capacity has been
analyzed in [12]. A lower bound of the randomness-assisted secrecy capacity has
been given. It is worth noting that the channel under consideration in this work
is effectively given by an interference channel where the legal sender and the
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jammer are allowed to make inputs to the system and the legal receiver as well
as the eavesdropper receive the corresponding outputs. We do leave open the
possibility of the jammer communicating his choice of input (equivalently: his
channel state sequence) to the eavesdropper, but limit the receiving parties such
that they cannot send any messages back to the jammer or the legal receiver.
During proofs and when defining the model, we will, however deviate from this
point of view and use a notation which respects the historic development of re-
sults on arbitrarily varying channels. The physical model we consider is that of
a classical-quantum channel, i.e., the legal sender’s and the jammer’s inputs are
classical data and the legal receiver’s as well as the eavesdroppers outputs are
quantum systems. The capacity of classical-quantum channels without secrecy
constraints or active jamming has been determined in [28] and [34].
A classical-quantum channel with a jammer is called an arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum channel. In [7] the capacity of arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum channels is analyzed. A lower bound of the capacity has been given.
An alternative proof and a proof of the strong converse are given in [11]. In [6]
the Ahlswede dichotomy for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels
is established, and a sufficient and necessary condition for the zero deterministic
capacity is given. In [18] a simplification of this condition for the arbitrarily vary-
ing classical-quantum channels is given. A classical-quantum channel with an
eavesdropper is called a classical-quantum wiretap channel, its secrecy capacity
has been determined in [23] and [20].
A classical-quantum channel with both a jammer and an eavesdropper is
called an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. It is defined as
a family of pairs of indexed channels {(Wt, Vt) : t = 1, . . . , T } with a common
input alphabet and possible different output systems, connecting a sender with
two receivers, a legal one and a wiretapper, where t is called a channel state of the
channel pair. The legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first part of the
pair, i.e., the first channelWt in the pair, and the wiretapper observes the output
of the second part, i.e., the second channel Vt, respectively. A channel state t,
which varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner, governs both the
legal receiver’s channel and the wiretap channel. A code for the channel conveys
information to the legal receiver such that the wiretapper knows nothing about
the transmitted information in the sense of the stronger security criterion (cf.
Remark 2.9). This is a generalization of compound classical-quantum wiretap
channels in [17], when the channel states are not stationary, but can change over
time.
The secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap
channels has been analyzed in [15]. A lower bound of the randomness-assisted
capacity has been given, and it has been shown that this bound is either a lower
bound for the deterministic capacity, or else the deterministic capacity is equal
to zero. As mentioned already, we will be interested in the role that different
forms of shared randomness play for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel. To this end, we will distinguish between three kinds of shared
randomness: randomness, common randomness, and correlation. Randomness
and common randomness have been used as a method of proof, e.g., in [3] and
much of the follow-up work for the determination of the random capacity. If
looked at as a resource for communication which is to be deployed in order to
make a communication link work reliably, they are, however, a rather strong
form of a resource: It is required that both sender and receiver have access to a
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perfect copy of the outcome of a random experiment. Moreover, the outcomes
of said experiment have to be distributed uniformly. The impact of deviations
from these strong requirements has not yet received much attention. What has
been investigated (starting with [8] and continued in [18]) is a variant where
the common randomness gets replaced by a resource that is in some sense the
complete opposite: correlation.
Assume that a bipartite source, modeled by an i.i.d. random variable (X,Y )
with values in a finite product set X×Y, is observed by the sender and (legal)
receiver. The sender has access to the random variable X and the receiver to Y .
We call (X,Y ) correlated shared randomness whenever the mutual information
between X and Y satisfies I(X ;Y ) > 0.
It has been shown in [8] that correlated shared randomness is a helpful
resource for information transmission through an arbitrarily varying classical
channel: The use of mere correlation does already allow one to transmit messages
at any rate that would be achievable using any form of shared randomness. The
capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel assisted by correlated shared
randomness as resource has been discussed in [18], where equivalent results were
found. In this work, we extend the concept of correlation-assisted coding to the
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel.
In [18] a classification of various resources is given. A distinction is made
between two extremal cases: randomness and correlation. Randomness is the
strongest resource, it requires a perfect copy of the outcome of a random exper-
iment, and thus we should assume an additional perfect channel. On the other
hand, correlation is the weakest resource. The work [18] also put emphasis on the
quantification of the differences between correlation and common randomness
and used the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel as a method of proof.
It can be shown that common randomness is a stronger resource than correla-
tion in the following sense: An example is given when not even a finite amount
of common randomness can be extracted from a given correlation. On the con-
trary, a sufficiently large amount of common randomness allows the sender and
receiver to asymptotically simulate the statistics of any correlation.
We concentrate our analysis on the case without feedback, i.e., we neither
allow the receiver to send messages back to the sender (or the jammer), nor do
we allow the eavesdropper to send messages toward the jammer (or the sender).
Such an approach may be deemed unsatisfactory from a practical perspective.
However, a brief look into the history of the arbitrarily varying channel reveals
that only the reduction to the case of deterministic codes (without feedback)
leads one to encounter those cases where the capacity of the system is zero, while
a dramatic increase to full capacity is possible as soon as shared randomness
(or feedback) is available.
In the situation investigated here, the reduction to forward communication
allows us to demonstrate the effect of super-activation of the secrecy capacity of
the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel. We take the space to write a
few lines concerning more elaborate models. The case where a (secure) channel
from the receiver to the sender is available is likely to be equivalent to the case
where shared randomness can be used when the average error criterion is used.
The latter will be treated in forthcoming work. In the model treated here, the
presence of an eavesdropper makes us take the freedom to allow randomness at
the encoder, which makes the average error criterion equivalent to the maximal
error criterion [3] (and [18] for the quantum case). The case of deterministic
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codes in the presence of feedback but with the code performance being evaluated
with respect to the maximal error criterion has been evaluated in [2].
It can easily be seen now that the complexity of the channel model under
investigation here necessitates a strict reduction in the abilities of the partici-
pating parties, at least if the aim is the establishment of definite results.
Our secrecy criterion is chosen such that the messages sent by the sender are
to be kept strongly secret. More precisely, the use of shared randomness creates
ensembles (Runi, Ztn) := (J
−1, Vtn(E
γ(·|j))Jj=1 where j = 1, . . . , J are messages
and Eγ(·|1), . . . , Eγ(·|J) are probability distributions of the codewords associ-
ated with the messages. The index γ refers to a particular choice of encoding
scheme. This index may be shared with the receiver (common randomness) or
may just be correlated with another index γ′ at the receiver (correlated codes,
in that case both γ and γ′ are actually elements of product alphabets Xn and
Yn).
Our strong secrecy criterion requires that the Holevo information χ(Runi, Ztn,γ)
of the ensembles consisting of the messages and the output at the eavesdrop-
per’s system is to be kept small in a yet to be defined sense. More precisely,
we require that the Holevo information is to be kept small on average over the
random choice of codewords and for all possible choices of the jammer, i.e.,
maxtn χ(Runi,Ztn |Γ) is to vanish asymptotically.
Using this secrecy criterion is a key to prove super-activation of the determin-
istic secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel: We
take two arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. One of them
is assumed to have zero capacity for message transmission because it is sym-
metrizable in the sense of [7], but its common-randomness-assisted capacity is
positive. The other is assumed to be non-symmetrizable but insecure.
In [32] a new code concept for secrecy capacity and a complete characteri-
zation of super-activation for classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channels with
no sharing resources has been given. In view of this work on classical arbitrarily
varying wiretap channels our further task will be to analyze this characterization
on arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
Through parallel transmission of common randomness on the insecure chan-
nel and secure data on the other one, the combined system can be proven to have
positive capacity. Roughly speaking, the proof uses the fact that the choices of
common randomness and messages are independent from each other and only
the codewords depend on both of them, together with the data processing in-
equality applied to the Holevo quantity. Details are to be found in the respective
section.
The operational interpretation of the secrecy criterion that we employ here
comes through application of the (quantum) Pinsker’s inequality. Note that, in
an average sense, the eavesdropper “knows” the index γ of the random code. It
is clear that, under such circumstances, backwards communication toward the
jammer would render the shared randomness completely useless.
A more in-depth discussion of secrecy criteria in the quantum case, including
fully quantum channels but not the arbitrarily varying case, can be found in the
recent preprint [39]. Different secrecy criteria for arbitrarily varying quantum
or classical-quantum channels will be evaluated in future work.
This paper is organized as follows.
The main definitions are given in Section 2.
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In Section 3 we generalize the result of [15] by establishing the Ahlswede di-
chotomy for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels (without
feedback), i.e., either the deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel is zero, or it equals its randomness-assisted
secrecy capacity.
In Section 4 we analyze the secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channel assisted by correlation as resource. We show that cor-
relation is a helpful resource for secure information transmission through an
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel.
In Section 5 we give an example in which both cases of the Ahlswede di-
chotomy for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels actually
occur. We present a new discovery for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channels which is a consequence of the Ahlswede dichotomy for the ar-
bitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. This phenomenon is called
“super-activation”, i.e., two arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap chan-
nels, both with zero deterministic secrecy capacity, if used together allow perfect
secure transmission.
Finally, we will conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of our results.
2 Communication Scenarios and Resources
2.1 Basic Definitions and Communication Scenarios
For a finite set A, we denote the set of probability distributions on A by P (A).
Let H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. We denote the (convex)
space of density operators on H by S(H). A classical-quantum channel is a
linear map W : P (A) → S(H), P (A) ∋ P → W (P ) ∈ S(H). Let a ∈ A. For
a Pa ∈ P (A), defined by Pa(a′) =
{
1 if a′ = a
0 if a′ 6= a
, we write W (a) instead of
W (Pa).
Remark 2.1. In many literature, a classical-quantum channel is defined as a
map A → S(H), A ∋ a→W (a) ∈ S(H). This is a special case when the input
is limited on the set {Pa : a ∈ A}.
For any finite set A, any finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space H , and
n ∈ N, we define An :=
{
(a1, . . . , an) : ai ∈ A ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
, and H⊗n :=
span
{
v1⊗ . . .⊗ vn : vi ∈ H ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
. We also write an for the elements
of An.
Associated with W is the channel map on the n-block W⊗n: P (An) →
S(H⊗n), such that W⊗n(Pn) = W (P1) ⊗ . . . ⊗W (Pn) if Pn ∈ P (An) can be
written as (P1, . . . , Pn). Let θ := {1, . . . , T } be a finite set. Let
{
Wt : t ∈ θ
}
be
a set of classical-quantum channels. For tn = (t1, . . . , tn), ti ∈ θ we define the
n-block Wtn such that for Wtn(P
n) = Wt1(P1)⊗ . . .⊗Wtn(Pn) if P
n ∈ P (An)
can be written as (P1, . . . , Pn).
Let P and Q be quantum systems, denote the Hilbert space of P and
Q by HP and HQ, respectively. We denote the space of density operators
on HP and HQ by S(HP) and S(HQ), respectively. A quantum channel N :
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S(HP)→ S(HQ), S(HP) ∋ ρ→ N(ρ) ∈ S(HQ) is represented by a completely
positive trace preserving map, which accepts input quantum states in S(HP)
and produces output quantum states in S(HQ).
Associated with N is the channel maps on the n-block N⊗n: S(HP
⊗n
) →
S(HQ
⊗n
) such that for ρn = ρ1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ ρn ∈ S(HP
⊗n
) N⊗n(ρn) = N(ρ1) ⊗
. . . ⊗ N(ρn). For tn = (t1, . . . , tn), ti ∈ θ, we define the n-block Ntn such that
for ρn = ρ1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ρn ∈ S(HP
⊗n
) we have Ntn(ρ
n) = Nt1(ρ1)⊗ . . .⊗Ntn(ρn).
We denote the identity operator on a space H by idH .
For a discrete random variable X on a finite set A and a discrete ran-
dom variable Y on a finite set B, we denote the Shannon entropy of X by
H(X) = −
∑
x∈A p(x) log p(x) and the mutual information between X and Y
by I(X ;Y ) =
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈B p(x, y) log
(
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
)
. Here p(x, y) is the joint prob-
ability distribution function of X and Y , and p(x) and p(y) are the marginal
probability distribution functions of X and Y , respectively, and “ log” means
logarithm to base 2.
For a quantum state ρ ∈ S(H), we denote the von Neumann entropy of ρ by
S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ) ,
where “ log” means logarithm to base 2. Let Φ := {ρx : x ∈ A} be a set of
quantum states labeled by elements of A. For a probability distribution Q on
A, the Holevo χ quantity is defined as
χ(Q; Φ) := S
(∑
x∈A
Q(x)ρx
)
−
∑
x∈A
Q(x)S (ρx) .
Note that we can always associate a state ρXY =
∑
xQ(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx to (Q; Φ)
such that χ(Q; Φ) = I(X ;Y ) holds for the quantum mutual information.
Definition 2.2. Let A be a finite set. Let H be a finite-dimensional complex
Hilbert space, and θ := {1, . . . , T } be a finite set. For every t ∈ θ, let Wt be
a classical-quantum channel P (A) → S(H). The set of the quantum channels
{Wt : t ∈ θ} defines an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel.
Strictly speaking, the set {Wt : t ∈ θ} generates the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum channel {Wtn : tn ∈ θn}. When the sender inputs a Pn ∈
P (An) into the channel, the receiver receives the output Wtn(P
n) ∈ S(H⊗n),
where tn = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ θn is the channel state of Wtn .
Definition 2.3. We say that the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel
{Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable if there exists a parametrized set of distributions
{τ(· | a) : a ∈ A} on θ such that for all a, a′ ∈ A,∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a)Wt(a
′) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | a′)Wt(a) .
Definition 2.4. Let P and Q be quantum systems, denote the Hilbert Space
of P and Q by HP and HQ, respectively, and let θ := {1, . . . , T } be a finite
set. For every t ∈ θ, let W ′t be a quantum channel S(HP) → S(HQ). We call
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the set of the quantum channels {W ′t : t ∈ θ} an arbitrarily varying quantum
channel when the state t varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner.
We denote the set of arbitrarily varying quantum channels S(HP) → S(HQ) by
C(HP, HQ).
Definition 2.5. Let A be a finite set. Let H and H ′ be finite-dimensional com-
plex Hilbert spaces. Let θ := {1, . . . , T } be a finite set. For every t ∈ θ let Wt
be a classical-quantum channel P (A) → S(H) and Vt be a classical-quantum
channel P (A) → S(H ′). We call the set of the classical-quantum channel pairs
{(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap chan-
nel, the legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first channel, i.e., Wt in
the pair (Wt, Vt), and the wiretapper observes the output of the second channel,
i.e., Vt in the pair (Wt, Vt), respectively, when the state t varies from symbol to
symbol in an arbitrary manner.
When the sender inputs a sequence an ∈ An into the channel, the receiver
receives the output Wtn(a
n) ∈ S(H⊗n), where tn = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ θn is the
channel state, while the wiretapper receives an output quantum state Vtn(a
n) ∈
S(H ′⊗n).
2.2 Code Concepts and Resources
Our goal is to see what the effects on the secrecy capacities of an arbitrarily
varying classical-quantumwiretap channel are if the sender and the legal receiver
have the possibility to use various kinds of resources. We also want to investigate
what amount of randomness is necessary for the robust and secure message
transmission through an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel.
Hence, we consider various kinds of resources, each of them requiring a different
amount of randomness, and we consider different codes, each of them requiring
a different kind of resource.
Definition 2.6. An (n, Jn) (deterministic) code C for the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} consists of a stochas-
tic encoder E : {1, . . . , Jn} → P (An), j → E(·|j), specified by a matrix of
conditional probabilities E(·|·), and a collection of positive semi-definite oper-
ators {Dj : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}} on H⊗n, which is a partition of the identity, i.e.,∑Jn
j=1Dj = idH⊗n . We call these operators the decoder operators.
A code is created by the sender and the legal receiver before the message trans-
mission starts. The sender uses the encoder to encode the message that he wants
to send, while the legal receiver uses the decoder operators on the channel output
to decode the message.
Remark 2.7. An (n, Jn) deterministic code C with deterministic encoder con-
sists of a family of n-length strings of symbols (cj)j∈{1,...,Jn} ∈ (A
n)
Jn and
a collection of positive semi-definite operators {Dj : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}} on H
⊗n
which is a partition of the identity.
The deterministic encoder is a special case of the stochastic encoder when we
require that for every j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, there is a sequence a
n ∈ An chosen with
probability 1. The standard technique for message transmission over a channel
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and robust message transmission over an arbitrarily varying channel is to use the
deterministic encoder (cf. [6] and [18]). However, we use the stochastic encoder,
since it is a tool for secure message transmission over wiretap channels (cf. [15]
and [7]).
Definition 2.8. A nonnegative number R is an achievable (deterministic) se-
crecy rate for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ} if for every ǫ > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exist an
(n, Jn) code C =
(
E, {Dnj : j = 1, . . . Jn}
)
such that log Jn
n
> R− δ, and
max
tn∈θn
Pe(C, t
n) < ǫ , (1)
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi;Ztn) < ζ , (2)
where Runi is the uniform distribution on {1, . . . Jn}. Here Pe(C, tn) (the average
probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C, when the channel state
of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is
tn = (t1, t2, . . . , tn)), is defined as
Pe(C, t
n) := 1−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(Wtn(E( |j))Dj) ,
Ztn =
{
Vtn(E( |i)) : i ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}
}
is the set of the resulting quantum state
at the output of the wiretap channel when the channel state of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
is tn.
Remark 2.9. A weaker and widely used security criterion is obtained if we
replace (2) with maxt∈θ
1
n
χ (Runi;Ztn) < ζ. In this paper we will follow [12] and
use (2).
Remark 2.10. When we defined Wt as A → S(H), then Pe(C, tn) is defined
as 1− 1
Jn
∑Jn
j=1
∑
an∈An E(a
n|j)tr(Wtn(an)Dj).
When deterministic encoder is used, then Pe(C, tn) is defined as 1−
1
Jn
∑Jn
j=1
tr(Wtn(cj)Dj).
Now we will define some further coding schemes, where the sender and the
receiver use correlation as a resource. We will later show that these coding
schemes are very helpful for the robust and secure message transmission over
an arbitrarily varying wiretap channel.
Definition 2.11. Let X and Y be finite sets. Let (X,Y ) be a random variable
distributed according to a probability distribution p ∈ P (X×Y).
An (X,Y )-correlation-assisted (n, Jn) code C(X,Y ) for the arbitrarily vary-
ing classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} consists of a set of
stochastic encoders {Exn : {1, . . . , Jn} → P (An) : xn ∈ Xn}, and a set of col-
lections of positive semi-definite operators
{
{D
(yn)
j : j = 1, . . . , Jn} : y
n ∈ Yn
}
on H⊗n which fulfills
∑Jn
j=1D
(yn)
j = idH⊗n for every y
n ∈ Yn.
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Definition 2.12. Let X and Y be finite sets, and let (X,Y ) be a random vari-
able distributed according to a joint probability distribution p ∈ P (X×Y).
A nonnegative number R is an achievable m− a− (X,Y ) secrecy rate (mes-
sage transmission under the average error criterion using (X,Y )-correlation-
assisted (n, Jn) codes) for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap chan-
nel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} if for every ǫ > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there
exists an (X,Y )-correlation-assisted (n, Jn) code C(X,Y ) =
{(
Exn , {D
(yn)
j :
j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}}
)
: xn ∈ Xn, yn ∈ Yn
}
such that log Jn
n
> R− δ, and
max
tn∈θn
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
yn∈Yn
p(xn,yn)Pe(C(x
n,yn), tn) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi;Ztn,xn | X) < ζ ,
where Pe(C(xn,yn), tn) is defined as
Pe(C(x
n,yn), tn) := 1−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(Wtn(Exn( |j))D
(yn)
j ) ,
χ (Runi;Ztn,xn | X) :=
∑
yn∈Yn
p(xn,yn)χ (Runi;Ztn,xn) ,
and Ztn,xn =
{
Vtn(Exn( |i)) : i ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}
}
, p(xn,yn) =
∏n
i=1 p(xi,yi).
Here we allowed Ztn,xn, the resulting quantum state of the wiretapper, to be
dependent on xn, this means that we do not require (X,Y ) to be secure against
eavesdropping.
Remark 2.13. Her we follow [18] and use the definition “m−a−(X,Y ) secrecy
rate” because it is important to point out that here the average error criterion is
used. Please see [18] for more discussions on the value of message transmission
under the average error criterion and message transmission under the maximum
error criterion.
Definition 2.14. Let
{
Cγ = {(Eγ , Dγj ) : j = 1, . . . , Jn} : γ ∈ Λ
}
be the the
set of (n, Jn) deterministic codes, labeled by a set Λ.
An (n, Jn) randomness-assisted quantum code for the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is a distribution G on
(Λ, σ), where σ is a sigma-algebra so chosen such that the functions γ →
Pe(Cγ , tn) and γ → χ (Runi;ZCγ ,tn) are both G-measurable with respect to σ
for every tn ∈ θn, where for tn ∈ θn and Cγ = {(w(j)n,γ , Dγj ) : j = 1, . . . , Jn},
ZCγ ,tn := {Vtn(w(1)
n,γ), Vtn(w(2)
n,γ), . . . , Vtn(w(n)
n,γ)} .
Remark 2.15. The randomness-assisted code technique is not to be confused
with the random encoding technique. For the random encoding technique, only
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the sender, but not the receiver, randomly chooses a code word in An to encode
a message j according to a probability distribution. The receiver should be able
to decode j even when he only knows the probability distribution, but not which
code word is actually chosen by the sender. For the randomness-assisted code
technique, the sender randomly chooses a stochastic encoder Eγ and the receiver
chooses a set of the decoder operators {Dγ
′
j : j = 1, . . . , Jn}. The receiver can
decode the message if and only if γ = γ′, i.e., when he knows the sender’s
randomization.
Definition 2.16. Let Λ and Cγ, γ ∈ Λ, be defined as in Definition 2.14. An
(n, Jn) common randomness-assisted quantum code for the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is is a finite subset
{
Cγ =
{(Eγ , Dγj ) : j = 1, . . . , Jn} : γ ∈ Γ
}
of the set of (n, Jn) deterministic codes,
labeled by a finite set Γ.
Definition 2.17. A nonnegative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for
the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
under randomness-assisted coding if for every δ > 0, ζ > 0, and ǫ > 0, if
n is sufficiently large, there is an (n, Jn) randomness-assisted quantum code
({Cγ : γ ∈ Λ}, G) such that log Jn
n
> R− δ, and
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG(γ) < ζ .
Here we allow ZCγ ,tn, the wiretapper’s resulting quantum state, to be depen-
dent on Cγ. This means that we do not require randomness to be secure against
eavesdropping.
Definition 2.18. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} under
common randomness-assisted quantum coding if for every δ > 0, ζ > 0, and
ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large, there is an (n, Jn) common randomness-assisted
quantum code ({Cγ : γ ∈ Γ}) such that log Jn
n
> R− δ, and
max
tn∈θn
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
Pe(C
γ , tn) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn | Γ) < ζ ,
where
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn | Γ) :=
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) .
This means that we do not require the common randomness to be secure
against eavesdropping.
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Wemay consider the deterministic code, the (X,Y )-correlation-assisted code,
the ((X,Y ), r)-correlation-assisted code, the (X,Y )-correlation-assisted (n, Jn)
code, and the common randomness-assisted quantum code as special cases of the
randomness-assisted quantum code. This means that randomness is a stronger
resource than both common randomness and the (X,Y )-correlation, in the sense
that it requires more randomness than common randomness and the (X,Y )-
correlation. Randomness is therefore a more “costly” resource.
Definition 2.19. Let {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} be an arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channel.
The supremum of all achievable (deterministic) secrecy rates of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈
θ} is called the (deterministic) secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, denoted by
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}).
The supremum of all achievable m−a−(X,Y ) secrecy rates of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
is called the m − a − (X,Y ) secrecy capacity, denoted by Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈
θ}; corr(X,Y )).
The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates under random-assisted quantum
coding of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is called the random-assisted secrecy capacity of
{(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, denoted by Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r).
The supremum of all achievable secrecy rates under common randomness-assisted
quantum coding of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is called the common randomness-assisted
secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}, denoted by Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; cr).
For an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈
θ} and random variable (X,Y ) distributed on finite sets X and Y, the following
facts are obvious and follow from the definitions.
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ})
≤ Cs((Wt, Vt)t∈θ; corr(X,Y ))
≤ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) , (3)
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) ≤ Cs((Wt, Vt)t∈θ; cr) ≤ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) . (4)
3 Ahlswede dichotomy for Arbitrarily Varying Classical-
Quantum Wiretap Channels
In this section, we analyze the secrecy capacities of various coding schemes
with resource assistance. Our goal is to see what the effects are on the secrecy
capacities of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel if we use
deterministic code, randomness-assisted code, or common randomness-assisted
code.
Theorem 3.1 (Ahlswede dichotomy). Let {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} be an arbitrar-
ily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel.
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1. (a) If the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {Wt : t ∈ θ} is
not symmetrizable, then
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) . (5)
(b) If {Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable,
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = 0 . (6)
2.
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; cr) = Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) . (7)
Proof. Our proof is similar to the proof of Ahlswede dichotomy for arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum channels in [7]. The different between our proof and
the proofs in [7] is that we have to additionally consider the security.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1. 2
At first we use random encoding technique to show the existence of a common
randomness-assisted code.
Choose arbitrary positive ǫ and ζ. Assume we have an (n, Jn) randomness-
assisted code ({Cγ : γ ∈ Λ}, G) for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} such that
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG(γ) < ζ .
Consider now n3 independent and identically distributed random variables
C1, C2, . . . , Cn3 with values in {C
γ : γ ∈ Λ} such that Pr(Ci = C) = G(C) for all
C ∈ {Cγ : γ ∈ Λ} and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n3}. For a fixed tn ∈ θn we have
P

 n3∑
i=1
χ
(
Runi, ZCi,tn
)
> n3λ


= P

exp

 n3∑
i=1
1
n
2χ
(
Runi, ZCi,tn
) > exp( 1
n
2n3λ)


≤ exp
(
−2n2λ
) n3∏
i=1
EG exp
(
1
n
2χ
(
Runi, ZCi,tn
))
= exp
(
−2n2λ
)
EG exp

 n3∑
i=1
1
n
2χ
(
Runi, ZCi,tn
)
14
≤ exp
(
−2n2λ
) n3∏
i=1
EG

1 + ∞∑
k=1
2k 1
n
χ
(
Runi, ZCi,tn
)
k!


= exp
(
−2n2λ
)1 + ∞∑
k=1
2k 1
n
EGχ
(
Runi, ZCi,tn
)
k!


n3
≤ exp
(
−2n2λ
) [
1 +
∞∑
k=1
2kǫ
nk!
]n3
= exp
(
−2n2λ
) [
1 +
1
n
ǫ exp 2
]n3
, (8)
the second inequality holds because the right side is part of the Taylor series.
We fix n ∈ N and define
hn(x) := n log(1 +
1
n
e2x)− x .
We have hn(0) = 0 and
h′n(x)
= n
1
1 + 1
n
e2x
1
n
e2 − 1
=
ne2
e2x+ n
− 1 .
ne2
e2x+n − 1 is positive if x <
e2−1
e
n, thus if cˆ < e
2−1
e
n, hn(x) is strictly
monotonically increasing in the interval ]0, cˆ]. Thus hn(x) is positive for 0 <
x ≤ cˆ. For every positive cˆ, cˆ < e
2−1
e
n holds if n > e
e2−1 cˆ. Thus for any positive
ǫ, ǫ ≤ n log(1 + 1
n
ǫ exp 2) if n is large enough. Choose λ ≤ ǫ and let n be
sufficiently large, we have λ ≤ n log(1 + 1
n
ǫ exp 2), therefore
exp
(
−2λn2
) [
1 +
1
n
ǫ exp 2
]n3
= exp
(
−λn2
)
exp
(
n2(−λ+ n log(1 +
1
n
ǫ exp 2))
)
≤ exp
(
−λn2
)
. (9)
By (8) and (9)
P

 n3∑
i=1
χ
(
Runi, ZCi,tn
)
> λn3 ∀tn ∈ θn


< |θ|n exp(−λn2)
= exp(n log |θ| − λn2)
= exp(−nλ) . (10)
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When Per < ζ holds, in a similar way as (8), choose λ ≤ ζ, we can show that
P

 n3∑
i=1
Pe(Ci, t
n) > λn3 ∀tn ∈ θn

 < e−λn . (11)
Let λ := min{ǫ, ζ}, we have
P

 n3∑
i=1
Pe(Ci, t
n) > λn3 or
n3∑
i=1
χ
(
Runi, ZCi,tn
)
> λn3 ∀tn ∈ θn

 ≤ 2e−λn3 .
We denote the event
En :=
{
C1, C2, . . . , Cn3 ∈ C
′
ν :
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
Pe(Ci, t
n) ≤ λ
and
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
χ (Runi, ZCi,tn) ≤ λ
}
.
If n is large enough, then P (En) is positive. This means En is not the empty set,
since P (∅) = 0 by definition. Thus there exist codes Ci =
(
Eni ,
{
Dnj,i : j = 1, . . . , Jn
})
∈ C′ν for i ∈ {1, . . . , n
3} with a positive probability such that
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
Pe(Ci, t
n) < λ and
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
χ (Runi, ZCi,tn) ≤ λ . (12)
By (12), for any n ∈ N and positive λ, if there is an (n, Jn) randomness-
assisted code ({Cγ : γ ∈ Λ}, G) for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} such that
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ) < λ ,
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG(γ) < λ ,
there is also an (n, Jn) common randomness-assisted code {C1, C2, . . . , Cn3} such
that
max
tn∈θn
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
Pe(Ci, t
n) < λ ,
max
tn∈θn
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
χ (Runi, ZCi,tn) < λ .
Therefore we have
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; cr) ≥ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) .
This and the fact that
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; cr) ≤ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) ,
prove Theorem 3.1. 2.
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3.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1. 1a
Now we are going to use Theorem 3.1. 2 to prove Theorem 3.1. 1a.
To show the lower bound in Theorem 3.1. 1a, we build a two-part code word,
which consists of a non-secure code word and a common randomness-assisted
secure code word. The non-secure one is used to create the common randomness
for the sender and the legal receiver. The common randomness-assisted secure
code word is used to transmit the message to the legal receiver.
Choose arbitrary positive ǫ and ζ. Assume we have an (n, Jn) randomness-
assisted code ({Cγ : γ ∈ Λ}, G) for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} such that
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG(γ) < ζ ,
by Theorem 3.1. 2, there is also an (n, Jn) common randomness-assisted code
{C1, C2, . . . , Cn3} such that
max
tn∈θn
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
Pe(Ci, t
n) < λ , (13)
max
tn∈θn
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
χ (Runi, ZCi,tn) < λ , (14)
where λ := min{ǫ, ζ}.
If the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {Wt : x ∈ X} is not sym-
metrizable, then by [7], the capacity for message transmission of {Wt : x ∈ X} is
positive. By Remark 2.7 we may assume that the capacity for message transmis-
sion of {Wt : x ∈ X} using deterministic encoder is positive. This means for any
positive ϑ, if n is sufficiently large, there is a code
((
c
µ(n)
i
)
i∈{1,...,n3}
, {D
µ(n)
i :
i ∈ {1, . . . , n3}}
)
with deterministic encoder of length µ(n), where 2µ(n) = o(n)
such that
1−
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
tr(Wtn(c
µ(n)
i )D
µ(n)
i ) ≤ ϑ . (15)
We now can construct a code Cdet =
(
Eµ(n)+n,
{
D
µ(n)+n
j : j = 1, . . . , Jn
})
,
where for aµ(n)+n = (aµ(n), an) ∈ Aµ(n)+n
Eµ(n)+n(aµ(n)+n|j) =
{
1
n3
Eni (a
n|j) if aµ(n) = c
µ(n)
i
0 else
,
and
D
µ(n)+n
j :=
n3∑
i=1
D
µ(n)
i ⊗D
n
i,j .
It is a composition of the code
(
c
µ(n)
i
)
i=1,...,n3
, {D
µ(n)
i : i = 1, . . . , n
3}) and the
code Ci = (Eni , {D
n
i,j : j = 1, . . . , Jn}. This is a code of length µ(n) + n.
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3.2.1 This code is secure against eavesdropping
We are going to show that the two-part code word is secure when the common
randomness-assisted part is secure. Since the two-part code can be seen as a
function of its common randomness-assisted part the idea is similar to applying
the quantum data processing inequality (cf. [38]) when we consider quantum
mutual information as security criterion.
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n3} let
Zi,tµ(n)+n :=
{
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗Vtn(E
n
i ( | 1)), . . . , Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗Vtn(E
n
i ( | Jn))
}
.
For any tµ(n)+n = (tµ(n), tn) we have
χ
(
Runi,Zi,tµ(n)+n
)
= S

 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
an∈An
Eni (a
n | j)Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(a
n)


−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
( ∑
an∈An
Eni (a
n | j)Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(a
n)
)
= S
(
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )
)
+ S

 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
an∈An
Eni (a
n | j)Vtn(a
n)

 − S (Vtµ(n)(cµ(n)i ))
−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
( ∑
an∈An
Eni (a
n | j)Vtn(a
n)
)
= S

 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))

− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S (Vtn(E
n
i ( | j)))
= χ (Runi, ZCi,tn) . (16)
By definition, we have
ZCdet,tµ(n)+n
=
{
Vtµ(n)+n(E
µ(n)+n( | 1)), . . . , Vtµ(n)+n(E
µ(n)+n( | Jn))
}
=
{
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
∑
an∈An
Eni (a
n | 1)Vtµ(n)+n
((
c
µ(n)
i , a
n
))
, . . . ,
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
∑
an∈An
Eni (a
n | Jn)Vtµ(n)+n
((
c
µ(n)
i , a
n
))}
=
{
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
∑
an∈An
Eni (a
n | 1)Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(a
n), . . . ,
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
∑
an∈An
Eni (a
n | Jn)Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(a
n)
}
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={
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | 1)), . . . ,
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | Jn))
}
.
By (14) and (16) for any tµ(n)+n = (tµ(n)tn) we have
χ
(
Runi, ZCdet,tµ(n)+n
)
≤ χ
(
Runi, ZCdet,tµ(n)+n
)
−
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
χ (Runi, ZCi,tn) + λ
= χ
(
Runi, ZCdet,tµ(n)+n
)
−
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
χ
(
Runi,Zi,tµ(n)+n
)
+ λ
= S

 1
Jn
1
n3
Jn∑
j=1
n3∑
i=1
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))


−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S

 1
n3
n3∑
i=1
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))


−
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
S

 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))


+
1
Jn
1
n3
Jn∑
j=1
n3∑
i=1
S
(
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))
)
+ λ . (17)
Let HH be a n3-dimensional Hilbert space, spanned by an orthonormal basis
{|i〉 : i = 1, . . . , n3}. Let HJ be a Jn dimensional Hilbert space, spanned by an
orthonormal basis {|j〉 : j = 1, . . . , Jn}. We define
ϕJHH
µ(n)+n
:=
1
Jn
1
n3
Jn∑
j=1
n3∑
i=1
|j〉〈j| ⊗ |i〉〈i| ⊗ Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j)) .
We have
ϕJH
µ(n)+n
= trH
(
ϕJHH
µ(n)+n
)
=
1
Jn
1
n3
Jn∑
j=1
n3∑
i=1
|j〉〈j| ⊗ Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j)) ,
ϕHH
µ(n)+n
= trJ
(
ϕJHH
µ(n)+n
)
=
1
Jn
1
n3
Jn∑
j=1
n3∑
i=1
|i〉〈i| ⊗ Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j)) ,
ϕH
µ(n)+n
= trJH
(
ϕJHH
µ(n)+n
)
=
1
Jn
1
n3
Jn∑
j=1
n3∑
i=1
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j)) .
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Furthermore
S(ϕJH
µ(n)+n
)
= S

 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
n3∑
i=1
|j〉〈j| ⊗ Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))


= H(Runi) +
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S

 1
n3
n3∑
i=1
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))

 ,
S(ϕHH
µ(n)+n
)
= S

 1
Jn
1
n3
Jn∑
j=1
n3∑
i=1
|i〉〈i| ⊗ Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))


= H(Yuni) +
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
S

 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))

 ,
S(ϕJHH
µ(n)+n
)
= S

 1
Jn
1
n3
Jn∑
j=1
n3∑
i=1
|j〉〈j| ⊗ |i〉〈i| ⊗ Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))


= H(Runi) +H(Yuni) +
1
Jn
1
n3
Jn∑
j=1
n3∑
i=1
S
(
Vtµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Vtn(E
n
i ( | j))
)
,
By strong subadditivity of von Neumann entropy it holds S(ϕJH
µ(n)+n
) +
S(ϕHH
µ(n)+n
) ≥ S(ϕH
µ(n)+n
) + S(ϕJHH
µ(n)+n
). Thus by (17) we have
χ
(
Runi, ZCdet,tµ(n)+n
)
≤ λ . (18)
3.2.2 The legal receiver is able to decode the message
We now use Theorem 3.1. 2 to show that the legal receiver’s average error goes
to zero.
For any tµ(n)+n ∈ θµ(n)+n, by (13) and (14),
Pe(C
det, tµ(n)+n)
= 1−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
( 1
n3
n3∑
i=1
Utµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Utn(E
n
i ( | j))

 ·

 n3∑
k=1
D
µ(n)
k ⊗D
n
k,j

)
≤ 1−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
[
Utµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )⊗ Utn(E
n
i ( | j))
]
·
[
D
µ(n)
k ⊗D
n
k,j
])
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= 1−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
[
Utµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )D
µ(n)
k
]
⊗
[
Utn(E
n
i ( | j))D
n
k,j
])
= 1−
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
(
tr
[
Utµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )D
µ(n)
k
]
·
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
[
Utn(E
n
i ( | j))D
n
k,j
])
= 1−
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
(
tr
[
Utµ(n)(c
µ(n)
i )D
µ(n)
k
]
· (1− Pe(Ci, t
n))
)
≤ 1− (1− ϑ− λ)
= λ+ ϑ , (19)
the second inequality holds because for non-negative numbers {αi, βi : i =
1, . . . ,M} such that 1
M
∑M
i=1 αi ≤ ϑ and
1
M
∑M
i=1 βi ≤ λ we have
1
M
∑M
i=1(1−
αi)(1− βi) ≥ 1− ϑ− λ.
For any n ∈ N and positive λ, if there is an (n, Jn) randomness-assisted code
({Cγ : γ ∈ Λ}, G) for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} such that
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG(γ) < ζ ,
choose δ = min{ǫ, ζ} + ϑ, by (19) and (18), we can find a (µ(n) + n, Jn) de-
terministic code Cdet =
(
Eµ(n)+n, {D
µ(n)+n
j : j = 1, . . . , Jn}
)
such that such
that
max
tµ(n)+n∈θµ(n)+n
Pe(C
det, tµ(n)+n) < λ ,
max
tµ(n)+n∈θµ(n)+n
χ
(
Runi, ZCdet,tµ(n)+n
)
< λ .
We know that 2µ(n) = o(n). For any positive ε, if n is large enough we
have 1
n
log Jn−
1
logn+n log Jn ≤ ε. Therefore, if the arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum channel {Wt : x ∈ X} is not symmetrizable, we have
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; cr) ≥ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r)− ε . (20)
This and the fact that
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; cr) ≤ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r)
prove Theorem 3.1. 1a (c.f. [7] for Ahlswede dichotomy for arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum channel Channels).
3.3 The proof of Theorem 3.1. 1b
If {Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable, the deterministic capacity of {Wt : t ∈ θ} using
a deterministic encoder is equal to zero by [7]. Now we have to check whether
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) using stochastic encoder remains equal to zero. The proof
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is rather standard. Readers with experiences in information theory may pass
over this subsection.
For any n ∈ N and Jn ∈ N \ {1}, let C =
(
En, {Dnj : j ∈ {1, . . . Jn}}
)
be an (n, Jn) deterministic code with a random encoder. We denote the set
of all deterministic encoders by Fn :=
{
fn : {1, . . . , Jn} → An
}
. Since the
deterministic capacity of {Wt : t ∈ θ} using deterministic encoder is zero, there
is a positive c such that for any n ∈ N we have
max
tn∈θn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
Wtn(fn(j))D
n
j
)
< 1− c . (21)
For any tn ∈ θn, we have
1− c
= (1− c)
∑
fn∈Fn
Jn∏
k=1
En(fn(k) | k)
>
∑
fn∈Fn
Jn∏
k=1
En(fn(k) | k)
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
Wtn(fn(j))D
n
j
)
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
an∈An
En(an | j)tr
(
Wtn(a
n)Dnj
)
=
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
Wtn(E
n( | j))Dnj
)
, (22)
the first equation holds because
∑
fn∈Fn
Jn∏
j=1
En(fn(j) | j)
=
∑
an
∑
fn(1)=an
(∑
an
∑
fn(2)=an
(
. . .
(∑
an
∑
fn(Jn−1)=an(∑
an
∑
fn(Jn)=an
Jn∏
j=1
En(fn(j) | j)
))
. . .
))
=
∑
an
∑
fn(1)=an
(∑
an
∑
fn(2)=an
(
. . .
(∑
an
∑
fn(Jn−1)=an(∑
an
En(an | Jn)
Jn−1∏
j=1
En(fn(j) | j)
))
. . .
))
=
∑
an
∑
fn(1)=an

∑
an
∑
fn(2)=an

. . .

∑
an
∑
fn(Jn−1)=an
Jn−1∏
j=1
En(fn(j) | j)

 . . .




=
∑
an
∑
fn(1)=an

∑
an
∑
fn(2)=an

. . .

∑
an
En(an | Jn)
Jn−1∏
j=1
En(fn(j) | j)

 . . .




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= . . .
=
∑
an
∑
fn(1)=an
En(fn(1) | 1)
=
∑
an
En(an | 1)
= 1 ,
the second equation holds because for any j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, we have
∑
fn∈Fn
Jn∏
k=1
En(fn(k) | k)tr
(
Wtn(fn(j))D
n
j
)
=
∑
an
∑
fn(j)=an
En(an | j)

∏
k 6=j
En(fn(k) | k)

 tr(Wtn(fn(j))Dnj
)
=
∑
an
∑
fn(j)=an
En(an | j)tr
(
Wtn(fn(j))D
n
j
)
=
∑
an
En(an | j)tr
(
Wtn(a
n)Dnj
)
.
By (22), for any n ∈ N, Jn ∈ N \ {1}, let C be any (n, Jn) deterministic code
with a random encoder, if {Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable, we have
max
t∈θ
Pe(C, t
n) > c .
Thus the only achievable deterministic secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is
log 1 = 0. Therefore Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = 0. (Actually, (22) shows that
if {Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable, even the deterministic capacity for mes-
sage transmission of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} with random encoding technique is
equal to zero. Since the deterministic secrecy capacity Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ})
cannot exceed the deterministic capacity for message transmission, we have
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = 0.) This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1. 1b.
As we learn from Example 5.1, there are indeed arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channels which have zero deterministic secrecy capacity and
positive random secrecy capacity. Therefore, as Theorem 3.1. 1 shows, ran-
domness is indeed a very helpful resource for the secure message transmission
through an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. But the prob-
lem is: how should the sender and the receiver know which code is used in the
particular transmission?
Theorem 3.1. 2 shows that common randomness capacity is always equal to
the random secrecy capacity, even for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channels of Example 5.1. Therefore, common randomness is an equally
helpful resource for the secure message transmission through an arbitrarily vary-
ing classical-quantum wiretap channel. However, as [18] showed, common ran-
domness is a very “costly” resource. As Theorem 3.1 shows, for the transmission
of common randomness we have to require that the deterministic capacity for
message transmission of the sender’s and legal receiver’s channel is positive.
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In the following Section 4, we will see that the much “cheaper” resource, the
m − a − (X,Y ) correlation, is also an equally helpful resource for the message
transmission through an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel. The ad-
vantage here is that we do not have to require that the deterministic capacity
for message transmission of the sender’s and legal receiver’s channel is positive.
4 Arbitrarily Varying Classical-Quantum Wire-
tap Channel with Correlation Assistance
In this section we consider the m − a − (X,Y ) correlation-assisted secrecy ca-
pacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel.
Theorem 3.1. 2 shows that common randomness is a helpful resource for the
secure message transmission through an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel. The m− a− (X,Y ) correlation is a weaker resource than com-
mon randomness (cf. [18]). We can simulate any m − a − (X,Y ) correlation
by common randomness asymptotically, but there exists a class of sequences of
bipartite distributions which cannot model common randomness (cf. Lemma 1
of [18]). However, the results of [18] show that the “cheaper” m−a− (X,Y ) cor-
relation is nevertheless a helpful resource for message transmission through an
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel. Our following Theorem 4.1 shows
that also in case of secure message transmission through an arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel, the m− a− (X,Y ) correlation assistance is
an equally helpful resource as common randomness.
Theorem 4.1. Let {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel. Let X and Y be finite sets. If I(X,Y ) > 0 holds for a random
variable (X,Y ) which is distributed according to a joint probability distribution
p ∈ P (X × Y), then the randomness-assisted secrecy capacity is equal to the
m− a− (X,Y ) correlation-assisted secrecy capacity.
Proof. Our proof is similar to the capacity results of arbitrarily varying channels
with correlation assistance in [8] and [18].
4.1 When the randomness-assisted code has positive se-
crecy capacity
If the randomness-assisted secrecy capacity of (Wt, Vt)t∈θ is positive, we can
build a new arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {U˜t : t ∈ θ} to create
common randomness for the sender and the legal receiver. We show that this
channel does not have to be secure to be useful for a secure code for the original
arbitrarily varying classical-quantumwiretap channel. Then, similar to our proof
of Theorem 3.1. 1, the sender and the legal receiver can build two-part code word,
which consists of a non-secure code word for {U˜t : t ∈ θ} to pass the index and
a common randomness-assisted secure code to transmit the message .
At first we assume that the m − a − (X,Y ) secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ} is positive, then the m − a − (X,Y ) capacity of the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum channel {Wt : t ∈ θ} is positive. For the definition of the
capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel please see [18].
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By Theorem 3.1. 2, the randomness-assisted secrecy capacity is equal to the
common randomness-assisted secrecy capacity. Let δ > 0, ζ > 0, and ǫ > 0,
and
{
Cγ =
(
Enγ , {D
n
γ,j : j ∈ {1, . . . Jn}}
)
: γ ∈ Γ
}
be an (n, Jn) common
randomness-assisted quantum code such that log Jn
n
> Cs((Wt, Vt)t∈θ, r) − δ,
and
max
tn∈θn
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
Pe(C
γ , tn) < ǫ ,
max
tn∈θn
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) < ζ .
We denote F := {f : f is a function X→ A}. Let HY be a Hilbert space of
dimension |Y| and {κ˘y : y ∈ Y} be a set of pairwise orthogonal and pure states
on HY. For every t ∈ θ,
U˜t(f) :=
∑
x
∑
y
p(x,y)κ˘y ⊗Wt (f(x)) (23)
defines a classical-quantum channel
U˜t : F→ S(H ⊗HY) .
{U˜t : t ∈ θ} defines an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel F →
S(H)⊗HY.
In [18] (see also [8] for a classical version), it was shown that if I(X,Y ) is
positive, the deterministic capacity of (U˜t)t∈θ is equal to the m − a − (X,Y )
capacity of {Wt : t ∈ θ}. By Remark 2.7, we may assume that the deterministic
capacity of (U˜t)t∈θ using deterministic encoder is positive. This means that
the sender and the receiver can build a code
((
f
ν(n)
γ
)
γ=1,...,|Γ|
, {D
ν(n)
γ : γ =
1, . . . , |Γ|}
)
with deterministic encoder for (U˜t)t∈θ of length ν(n), where 2
ν(n)
is in polynomial order of n and f
ν(n)
γ (xν(n)) =
(
fγ,1(x1), . . . , fγ,ν(n)(xν(n))
)
for xν(n) = (x1, . . . ,xν(n)), such that the following statement is valid. For any
positive ϑ, if n is large enough, we have
1− ϑ
≤ min
tν(n)∈θν(n)
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
tr
(
U˜tν(n)
(
fν(n)γ
)
Dν(n)γ
)
= min
tν(n)∈θν(n)
1
|Γ|
tr
( |Γ|∑
γ=1
∑
xν(n)∈Xν(n)
∑
yν(n)∈Yν(n)
p
(
xν(n),yν(n)
)
·
[
κ˘yn ⊗Wtν(n)(f
ν(n)
γ (x
ν(n)))
]
Dν(n)γ
)
= min
tν(n)∈θν(n)
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
∑
xν(n)∈Xν(n)
∑
yν(n)∈Yν(n)
p
(
xν(n),yν(n)
)
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· tr
(
Wtν(n)(c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)D
ν(n)
(yν(n)),γ
)
, (24)
where for every γ ∈ Γ, xν(n) = (x1, . . . ,xν(n)) ∈ X
ν(n), and yν(n) = (y1, . . . ,yν(n)) ∈
Yν(n), we set p(xν(n),yν(n)) =
∏
i,j p(xi,yj),
c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
:= fν(n)γ (x
ν(n)) ∈ Aν(n) ,
and
D
ν(n)
(yν(n)),γ
:= trH
Y
ν(n)
(
(κ˘yν(n) ⊗ idH⊗ν(n))D
ν(n)
γ
)
.
The last equation of (24) holds because
tr
(
Wtν(n)(c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)trH
Y
ν(n)
(
(κ˘yν(n) ⊗ idH⊗ν(n))D
ν(n)
γ
))
= tr
([
idH
Y
ν(n)
⊗Wtν(n)(c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)
][
κ˘yν(n) ⊗ idH⊗ν(n)
]
Dν(n)γ
)
= tr
([
κ˘yν(n) ⊗Wtν(n)(c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)
]
Dν(n)γ
)
.
Since
∑|Γ|
γ=1D
ν(n)
(yν(n)),γ
=
∑|Γ|
γ=1 trHYν(n)
(
(κ˘yν(n)⊗idH⊗ν(n))D
ν(n)
γ
)
= trH
Y
ν(n)
(
(κ˘yν(n)⊗
idH⊗ν(n))
∑|Γ|
γ=1D
ν(n)
γ
)
= idH⊗ν(n) , we can define an (X,Y )-correlation-assisted
(ν(n), |Γ|) code (this is a code with deterministic encoder) by
((
c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)
γ∈{1,...,|Γ|}
,
{D
ν(n)
(yν(n)),γ
: γ ∈ {1, . . . , |Γ|}}
)
.
Now we can construct an (X,Y )-correlation-assisted (ν(n) + n, Jn) code
C(X,Y ) =
{(
Exν(n)+n , {D
yν(n)+n
j : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}}
)
: xν(n)+n ∈ Xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n ∈
Yν(n)+n
}
, where for xν(n)+n = (xν(n),xn), yν(n)+n = (yν(n),yn) and aν(n)+n =
(aν(n), an) ∈ Aν(n)+n
Exν(n)+n(a
ν(n)+n|j) =
{
1
|Γ|Eγ(a
n|j) if aν(n) = c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
0 else
,
and
D
yν(n)+n
j :=
|Γ|∑
γ=1
D
ν(n)
(yν(n)),γ
⊗Dnγ,j .
For any γ ∈ {1, . . . , |Γ|} let
Zγ,tν(n)+n,xν(n)+n
:=
{
Vtν(n)
(
c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)
⊗ Vtn (Eγ(a
n|1)) , . . . ,
Vtν(n)
(
c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)
⊗ Vtn (Eγ(a
n|Jn))
}
.
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Similar to (16), for any xν(n)+n ∈ Xν(n)+n, γ ∈ Γ, and tν(n)+n = (tν(n)tn) we
have
χ
(
Runi,Zγ,tν(n)+n,xν(n)+n
)
= χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) . (25)
By definition we have
Ztν(n)+n,xν(n)+n :={
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
Vtν(n)(c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)⊗ Vtn(Eγ( |1)), . . . ,
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
i=1
Vtν(n)(c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)⊗ Vtn(Eγ( |Jn))
}
.
Similar to (17) let λ := min{ǫ, ζ}, for any tν(n)+n = (tν(n), tn), xν(n)+n =
(xν(n),xn) and yν(n)+n = (yν(n),yn) we have
∑
xν(n)+n∈Xν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n∈Yν(n)+n
p
(
xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n
)
χ
(
Runi, Ztν(n)+n,xν(n)+n
)
≤
∑
xν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n
p
(
xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n
)
χ
(
Runi, Ztν(n)+n,xν(n)+n
)
−
∑
xν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n
p
(
xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n
) 1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) + λ
=
∑
xν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n
p
(
xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n
)
χ
(
Runi, Ztν(n)+n,xν(n)+n
)
−
∑
xν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n
p
(
xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n
) 1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
χ
(
Runi,ZCγ ,tν(n)+n,xν(n)+n
)
+ λ
=
∑
xν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n
p
(
xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n
)[
S

 1
Jn
1
|Γ|
Jn∑
j=1
|Γ|∑
i=1
Vtν(n)
(
c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)
⊗ Vtn (Eγ( |j))


−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S

 1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
i=1
Vtν(n)
(
c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)
⊗ Vtn (Eγ( |j))


−
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
i=1
S

 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
Vtν(n)
(
c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)
⊗ Vtn (Eγ( |j))


+
1
Jn
1
|Γ|
Jn∑
j=1
|Γ|∑
i=1
S
(
Vtν(n)
(
c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)
⊗ Vtn (Eγ( |j))
)]
+ λ
≤ λ . (26)
By (24), for any tν(n)+n ∈ θν(n)+n,∑
xν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n
p(xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n)Pe
(
C(xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n), tν(n)+n
)
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= 1−
∑
xν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n
p
(
xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n
) 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
([
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
Vtν(n)(c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)⊗ Vtn(Eγ( |j))
]
·

 |Γ|∑
γ=1
D
ν(n)
(yν(n)),γ
⊗Dnγ,j

)
≤ 1−
∑
xν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n
p(xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n)
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1[
Vtν(n)(c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)⊗ Vtn(Eγ( |j))
]
·
[
D
ν(n)
(yν(n)),γ
⊗Dnγ,j
])
= 1−
∑
xν(n)
∑
yν(n)
p(xν(n),yν(n))
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1[
Vtν(n)(c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)D
ν(n)
(yν(n)),γ
]
⊗
[
Vtn(Eγ( |j))D
n
γ,j
])
= 1−
∑
xν(n)
∑
yν(n)
p(xν(n),yν(n))
1
|Γ|
|Γ|∑
γ=1
tr
(
Vtν(n)(c
ν(n)
xν(n),γ
)D
ν(n)
(yν(n)),γ
)
·

 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(Vtn(Eγ( |j))D
n
γ,j)


≤ λ+ ϑ . (27)
We now combine (27) and (26) and obtain the following result.
If I(X,Y ) and the m − a − (X,Y ) secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
are positive, we define λ := min{ǫ, ζ}+ ϑ and the following statement is valid.
For any n ∈ N and positive λ, if there is an (n, Jn) randomness-assisted code
({Cγ : γ ∈ Λ}, G) for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} such that
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ) < ǫ ,
and
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG(γ) < ζ ,
then there is also a (ν(n)+n, Jn) common randomness-assisted code C(X,Y ) ={(
Exν(n)+n , D
yν(n)+n
j
)
: j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn},xν(n)+n ∈ Xν(n)+nyν(n)+n ∈ Yν(n)+n
}
such that
max
tν(n)+n∈θν(n)+n
∑
xν(n)+n∈Xν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n∈Yν(n)+n
p(xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n)
Pe(C(x
ν(n)+n,yν(n)+n), tν(n)+n) < λ , (28)
and
max
tν(n)+n∈θν(n)+n
χ
(
Runi;Ztν(n)+n,xν(n)+n | X
)
< λ . (29)
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(28) and (29) mean that
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; corr(X,Y )) ≥ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r)−
1
n
· log Jn
+
1
ν(n) + n
log Jn .
We know that 2ν(n) is in polynomial order of n. For any positive ε, if n is
large enough we have 1
n
log Jn −
1
logn+n log Jn ≤ ε. Therefore, if I(X,Y ) and
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; corr(X,Y )) are both positive, we have
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; corr(X,Y )) ≥ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r)− ε . (30)
This and the fact that
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; corr(X,Y )) ≤ Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) ,
prove Theorem 4.1 for the case that Cs((Wt, Vt)t∈θ; corr(X,Y )) is positive.
4.2 When the randomness-assisted code has zero secrecy
capacity
If the randomness-assisted secrecy capacity of (Wt, Vt)t∈θ is equal to zero, with
a similar technique as the techniques in [8] and [18] we show that the (X,Y )
correlation-assisted secrecy capacity of (Wt, Vt)t∈θ is also equal to zero.
Now we assume that the m−a−(X,Y ) secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
is equal to zero. If Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) is also equal to zero, then there is
nothing to prove. Thus let us assume that Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) is positive.
Assume that there is an (n, Jn) randomness-assisted code ({Cγ : γ ∈ Λ}, G)
for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} such that
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ) < λ ,
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
χ (Runi, ZCγ ,tn) dG(γ) < λ .
We denote F and the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel (U˜t)t∈θ : F→
S(Hn|Y|) as above. If the deterministic capacity of (U˜t)t∈θ is positive, we can
build, as above, a (ν(n) + n, Jn) common randomness-assisted code C(X,Y ) ={(
Exν(n)+n , {D
yν(n)+n
j : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}}
)
: xν(n)+n ∈ Xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n ∈
Yν(n)+n
}
such that
max
tν(n)+n∈θν(n)+n
∑
xν(n)+n∈Xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n∈Yν(n)+n
p(xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n)
Pe(C(x
ν(n)+n,yν(n)+n), tν(n)+n) < ǫ ,
max
tν(n)+n∈θν(n)+n
∑
yν(n)+n∈Yν(n)+n
p
(
xν(n)+n,yν(n)+n
)
χ
(
Runi;Ztν(n)+n,xν(n)+n
)
< ζ .
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But this would mean
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; corr(X,Y )) = Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) ,
and there is nothing to prove.
Thus we may assume that the deterministic capacity of (U˜t)t∈θ is equal
to zero. This implies that (U˜t)t∈θ is symmetrizable (cf. [7]), i.e., there is a
parametrized set of distributions {τ(· | f) : f ∈ F} on θ such that for all f ,
f ′ ∈ F we have
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | f ′)
∑
x
∑
y
P (X×Y) κ˘y ⊗Wt (f(x)) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | f)
∑
x
∑
y
P (X×Y) κ˘y ⊗Wt (f
′(x))
⇒
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | f ′)
∑
x
P (X×Y)Wt (f(x)) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | f)
∑
x
P (X×Y)Wt (f
′(x))
(31)
for all y ∈ Y.
Our approach is similar to the technique of [8]. Let A = {0, 1, . . . , |A| − 1},
X = Y = {0, 1}. We define functions g∗ and gi ∈ F for i = 1, . . . , a − 1 such
that g∗(0) = g∗(1) = 0 and gi(u) := i + u mod |A| for u ∈ {0, 1}. Since
(U˜t)t∈θ is symmetrizable, by (31) there is a parametrized set of distributions
{τ(t | f) : f ∈ F} on θ such that for all a ∈ A, the following two equalities are
valid ∑
t∈θ
p(0, 0)τ(t | g∗)Wt(a)
+
∑
t∈θ
p(1, 0)τ(t | g∗)Wt(a+ 1 mod |A|)
=
∑
t∈θ
p(0, 0)τ(t | gi)Wt(a)
+
∑
t∈θ
p(1, 0)τ(t | gi)Wt(a)
=
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | gi)Wt(a) ;
∑
t∈θ
p(0, 1)τ(t | g∗)Wt(a)
+
∑
t∈θ
p(1, 1)τ(t | g∗)Wt(a+ 1 mod |A|)
=
∑
t∈θ
p(0, 1)τ(t | gi)Wt(a)
+
∑
t∈θ
p(1, 1)τ(t | gi)Wt(a)
=
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | gi)Wt(a) .
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If we choose an arbitrary orthonormal basis on H to write the following
quantum states in form of matrices
(mk,l)k,l=1,...,dimH =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | g∗)Wt(a) ,
(m′k,l)k,l=1,...,dimH =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | g∗)Wt(a+ 1 mod |A|) ,
(m∗k,l)k,l=1,...,dimH =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | gi)Wt(a) ,
for all k, l ∈ {1, . . . , dimH} we have
p(0, 0)mk,l + p(1, 0)m
′
k,l = m∗k,l ,
p(0, 1)mk,l + p(1, 1)m
′
k,l = m∗k,l .
Since I(X,Y ) is positive, p(0, 0) 6= p(1, 0) and p(0, 1) 6= p(1, 1), there-
fore det
(
p(0, 0) p(1, 0)
p(0, 1) p(1, 1)
)
6= 0. Thus mk,l = m′k,l = m∗k,l for all k, l ∈
{1, . . . , dimH}, this means∑
t∈θ
τ(t | g∗)Wt(a) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | g∗)Wt(a+ 1 mod |A|)
for all a ∈ A.
Therefore, for any n ∈ N and any given (n, Jn) code Cγ =
(
Eγ , {Dγj : j =
1, . . . , Jn}
)
, the following statement is valid. Let a′
n
be an arbitrary sequence
in An, we have∑
tn∈θn
τ(tn | g∗)Pe(C
γ , tn)
=
∑
tn∈θn
τ(tn | g∗)

1− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(Wtn(Eγ( |j))D
γ
j )


=
∑
tn∈θn
τ(tn | g∗)

1− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
an∈An
Eγ(an|j)tr(Wtn(a
n)Dγj )


= 1−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
an∈An
Eγ(an|j)tr
( ∑
tn∈θn
τ(tn | g∗)Wtn(a
n)Dγj
)
= 1−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
an∈An
Eγ(an|j)tr
( ∑
tn∈θn
τ(tn | g∗)Wtn(a
′n)Dγj
)
= 1−
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
( ∑
tn∈θn
τ(tn | g∗)Wtn(a
′n)Dγj
)
= 1−
1
Jn
∑
tn∈θn
τ(tn | g∗)tr

Wtn(a′n) Jn∑
j=1
D
γ
j


31
= 1−
1
Jn
∑
tn∈θn
τ(tn | g∗)tr
(
Wtn(a
′n)
)
= 1−
1
Jn
, (32)
where τ(tn | g∗) := τ(t1 | g
∗)τ(t2 | g
∗) . . . τ(tn | g
∗) for tn = (t1, t2, . . . , tn). The
second and the fifth equations hold because the trace function and matrices’
multiplication are linear. The first, the fourth, and the last equations hold be-
cause
∑
tn∈θn τ(t
n | g∗) =
∑
an∈An E
γ(an|j) = tr
(
Wtn(a
′n)
)
= 1 for all g∗, j,
and a′n. The sixth equation holds because
∑Jn
j=1D
γ
j = id.
Thus for any n ∈ N, any Jn ∈ N \ {1}, and any (n, Jn) randomness-assisted
quantum code ({Cγ : γ ∈ Λ}, G) we have
Jn − 1
Jn
=
∫
Λ
∑
tn∈θn
τ(tn | g∗)Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ)
=
∑
tn∈θn
τ(tn | g∗)
∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ)
= E
(∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ ,Tn)dG(γ)
)
, (33)
where Tn is a random variable on θn such that Pr(Tn = tn) = τ(tn | g∗) for all
tn ∈ θn.
By (33) for any n ∈ N, any Jn ∈ N \ {1} and any (n, Jn) random-assisted
quantum code ({Cγ : γ ∈ Λ}, G), there exists at least one tn ∈ θn such that∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ) ≥
Jn − 1
Jn
. (34)
By (34) for any n ∈ N, any Jn > 1, there is no (n, Jn) randomness-assisted
code ({Cγ : γ ∈ Λ}, G) for {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} such that
max
tn∈θn
∫
Λ
Pe(C
γ , tn)dG(γ) <
1
2
,
therefore if the m − a − (X,Y ) secrecy capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is equal
to zero and I(X,Y ) is positive, the randomness-assisted secrecy capacity of
{(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is equal to log 1 = 0. But this is a contradiction to our
assumption that Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) is positive.
This result and the result for the case when the m − a − (X,Y ) secrecy
capacity of {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} is positive complete our proof for Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1 shows that the correlation is a very helpful resource for the
secure message transmission through an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel. As Example 5.1 shows, there are indeed arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channels which have zero deterministic secrecy ca-
pacity, but at the same time positive random secrecy capacity. Theorem 4.1
shows that if we have a m−a− (X,Y ) correlation as a resource, even when it is
insecure and very weak (i.e. I(X,Y ) needs only to be slightly larger than zero),
these channels will have a positive m− a− (X,Y ) secrecy capacity.
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5 Applications and Further Notes
In Subsection 5.1 we will discuss the importance of the Ahlswede dichotomy for
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. We will show that it can
occur that the deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel is not equal to its randomness-assisted capacity.
In Subsection 5.1.1 we will show that the research in quantum channels
not only sets limitations, but also offers new fascinating possibilities. Applying
the Ahlswede dichotomy, we can prove that two arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channels, both with zero security capacity, allow perfect secure
transmission, if we use them together. This is a phenomenon called “super-
activation” which appears in quantum information theory (cf. [31]).
5.1 Further Notes on Resource Theory
In this subsection, we give some notes on resource theory and the Ahlswede
dichotomy.
1) The Ahlswede dichotomy states that either the deterministic security ca-
pacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel is zero or it
equals its randomness-assisted security capacity. There are actually arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum wiretap channels which have zero deterministic secu-
rity capacity, but achieve a positive security capacity if the sender and the legal
receiver can use a resource, as the following example shows. This shows that the
Ahlswede dichotomy is indeed a “dichotomy”, and how helpful a resource can be
for the robust and secure message transmission.
Example 5.1. Let {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channel. By Theorem 3.1. 1, Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) is equal to Cs({(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ}; r) if {Wt : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable, and equal to zero if {Wt : t ∈ θ}
is symmetrizable. If {Wt : t ∈ θ} is symmetrizable, it can actually occur that
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) is zero, but Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) is positive, as
following example shows (c.f. [7] for the case of an arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum channel without wiretap).
Let θ := {1, 2}. Let A = {0, 1}. Let HB = C3. Let {|0〉B, |1〉B, |2〉B be a set
of orthonormal vectors on HB.
For r ∈ [0, 1] let Pr be the probability distribution on A such that Pr(0) = r
and Pr(1) = 1− r. We define a channel W1 : P (A) → S(H
B) by
W1(Pr) = r|0〉〈0|
B + (1− r)|1〉〈1|B ,
and a channel W2 : P (A) → S(HB) by
W1(Pr) = r|1〉〈1|
B + (1− r)|2〉〈2|B .
In other word
W1(0) = |0〉〈0|
B ,
W1(1) = |1〉〈1|
B ,
W2(0) = |1〉〈1|
B ,
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W2(1) = |2〉〈2|
B .
Let HE = C2. Let {|3〉E, |4〉E be a set of orthonormal vectors on HE.
We define a channel V1 : P (A) → S(HE) by
V1(Pr) = |3〉〈3|
E ,
and a channel V2 : P (A) → S(H
E) by
V1(Pr) = |4〉〈4|
E .
{(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} defines an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap
channel.
We set
τ(1 | 0) = 0 ; τ(2 | 0) = 1 ;
τ(1 | 1) = 1 ; τ(2 | 1) = 0 .
It holds∑
t∈θ
τ(t | 0)Wt(0) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | 0)Wt(0) ,
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | 1)Wt(1) =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | 1)Wt(1) ,
and ∑
t∈θ
τ(t | 0)Wt(1) = |1〉〈1|
E =
∑
t∈θ
τ(t | 1)Wt(0) .
{(Wt) : t ∈ θ} is therefore symmetrizable. By Theorem 3.1. 1, we have
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}) = 0 . (35)
By [15], for any arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) :
t ∈ θ}, we have
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r)
≥ max
P∈P
(
min
Q∈Q
χ
(
P, {UQ(a) : a ∈ A}
)
− lim
n→∞
max
tn∈θn
1
n
χ(Pn, {Vtn(a
n) : an ∈ An})
)
, (36)
where P is the set of distributions on A, Q is the set of distributions on θ, and
UQ(a) =
∑
t∈ΘQ(t)Wt(a) for Q ∈ Q.
For all n ∈ N, tn ∈ θn, and Pn ∈ Pn, we have χ(Pn, {Vtn(an) : an ∈ An}) =
1 log 1− 1 log 1 = 0 and therefore
Cs({(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}; r) ≥ max
P∈P
min
Q∈Q
χ
(
P, {UQ(a) : a ∈ A}
)
.
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We denote by p′ ∈ P (A) the distribution on A such that p′(1) = p′(2) = 12 .
Let q ∈ [0, 1]. We define Q(1) = q, Q(2) = 1− q. We have
χ
(
p′, {W 0Q(a) : a ∈ A}
)
= −
1
2
q log
1
2
q +
1
2
(1− q) log
1
2
(1− q)−
1
2
log
1
2
+ q log q + (1− q) log(1 − q) .
By the differentiation by q, we obtain
1
log e
(
−
1
2
log
1
2
q −
1
2
+
1
2
log
1
2
(1− q) +
1
2
+ log q + 1− log(1 − q)− 1
)
=
1
2 log e
(log q − log(1− q)) .
This term is equal to zero if and only if q = 12 . By further calculation, one
can show that χ
(
p′, {W 0Q(a) : a ∈ A}
)
achieves its minimum when q = 12 . This
minimum is equal to − 12 log
1
4 +
1
2 log
1
2 =
1
2 > 0. Thus
max
p
min
q
χ
(
p,B0q
)
≥
1
2
.
For all t ∈ θ, it holds V 0t (0) = V
0
t (1) and therefore for all t
n ∈ θn and any
pn ∈ P (An), we have
χ(p;Z0tn)
= S(V 0tn(p
n))−
∑
an∈An
pn(an)S(V 0tn(a
n))
= 0 .
By (36),
Cs({(W
0
t , V
0
t ) : t ∈ θ}, cr) ≥
1
2
− 0 > 0 . (37)
This shows an example of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel
such that its deterministic capacity is zero, but its random capacity is positive.
Thus, a “useless” arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel, i.e., with zero
deterministic secrecy capacity, allows secure transmission if the sender and the
legal receiver have the possibility to use a resource, either randomness, common
randomness, or even a “cheap”, insecure, and weak correlation. Here we say
“cheap” and “weak” in the sense of the discussion in Section 4.
5.1.1 Super-Activation
One of the properties of classical channels is that in the majority of cases,
if we have a channel system where two sub-channels are used together, the
capacity of this channel system is the sum of the two sub-channels’ capacities.
Particularly, a system consisting of two orthogonal classical channels, where
both are “useless” in the sense that they both have zero capacity for message
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transmission, the capacity for message transmission of the whole system is zero
as well (“0+ 0 = 0”). For the definition of “two orthogonal channels” in classical
systems, please see [25].
In contrast to the classical information theory, it is known that the capacities
of quantum channels can be super-additive, i.e., there are cases in which the
capacity of the product W1⊗W2 of two quantum channels W1 and W2 is larger
than the sum of the capacity of W1 and the capacity of W2 (cf. [31] and [26]).
“The whole is greater than the sum of its parts” - Aristotle.
Particularly in quantum information theory, there are examples of two quan-
tum channels, W1 and W2, with zero capacity, which allow perfect transmission
if they are used together, i.e., the capacity of their product W1⊗W2 is positive,
(cf. [36], [35], [33] and also [19] for a rare case result when this phenomenon
occurs using two classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channels). This is due to
the fact that there are different reasons why a quantum channel can have zero
capacity. We call this phenomenon “super-activation” (“0 + 0 > 0”).
It is known that arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels with
positive secrecy capacities are super-additive. This means that the productW1⊗
W2 of two arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels W1 and W2,
both with positive secrecy capacities, can have a capacity which is larger than
the sum of the capacity of W1 and the capacity of W2 (cf. [31]).
Using Theorem 3.1. 3.1, we can demonstrate the following Theorem,
Theorem 5.2. Super-activation occurs for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channels.
Please note that the results of [31] (super-additivity of arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channels with positive secrecy capacities) do not im-
ply super-activation of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels,
since here we consider channels with zero secrecy capacity.
We will prove Theorem 5.2 by giving an example (Example 5.3) in which two
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, which are themselves
“useless” in the sense that they have both zero secrecy capacity, acquire positive
secrecy capacity when used together. This is due the following.
Suppose we have an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap chan-
nel with positive randomness-assisted secrecy capacity. By Theorem 3.1. 2,
the randomness-assisted secrecy capacity is equal to the common randomness-
assisted secrecy capacity. But the problem for the sender and the legal receiver
is that each party does not know which code is used in the particular trans-
mission if the channel that connects them has zero deterministic capacity for
message transmission. However, suppose we have another arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel which has a positive deterministic capacity
for message transmission. Then the sender and the legal receiver can use it to
transmit which code is used in the particular transmission. This is possible even
when the second arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel has zero
randomness-assisted secrecy capacity, since we allow the wiretapper to know
which specific code is used.
We may see it in the following way. If we have two arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channels, one of them is relatively secure, but not
very robust against jamming, while the other one is relatively robust, but not
very secure against eavesdropping. We can achieve that they “remove” their
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weaknesses from each other, or, in other words, “activate” each other.
We now give an example of super-activation for arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channels.
Example 5.3. Let θ = {1, 2}, A = {0, 1}, and let H = H ′ be spanned by the
orthonormal vectors |0〉 and |1〉. We define {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} as in Example 5.1.
We define {(W ′t, V ′t) : t ∈ θ} by
W ′1(0) =
3
4
|0〉〈0|+
1
4
|1〉〈1|
W ′1(1) =
1
4
|0〉〈0|+
3
4
|1〉〈1|
W ′2(0) =
3
4
|0〉〈0|+
1
4
|1〉〈1|
W ′2(1) =
1
4
|0〉〈0|+
3
4
|1〉〈1|
V ′1(0) = |0〉〈0|
V ′1(1) = |1〉〈1|
V ′2(0) = |0〉〈0|
V ′2(1) = |1〉〈1| . (38)
We denote the uniform distribution on A by P . We have P (0) = P (1) = 12 .
By [7] the capacity of {W ′t : t ∈ θ} is larger or equal tominQ∈Q χ
(
P, {UQ(a) : a ∈ A}
)
= 12 −
3
4 log
3
4 > 0.
However, for all (n, Jn) code
(
En, {Dnj : j = 1, . . . , Jn}
)
the wiretapper can
define a set of decoding operators {Dnj,wiretap : j = 1, . . . Jn} by D
n
j,wiretap :=∑
an E
n (an | j) (
⊗
i |ai〉) (
⊗
i〈ai|). For any probability distribution Q
n on An,
denote the wiretapper’s random output using {Dnj,wiretap : j = 1, . . . , Jn} at
channel state tn by Ctn , then χ(Q
n, Ztn) ≥ I(Qn, Ctn) = H(Qn), where I(·, ·)
is the mutual information, and H(·) is the Shannon entropy (please cf. [21] for
the definitions of the mutual information and the Shannon entropy for classical
random variables). If χ(Runi, Ztn) <
1
2 holds, we also have log Jn = H(Runi) <
1
2 , but this implies Jn = 1. Thus
Cs({(W
′
t, V
′
t) : t ∈ θ}) = 0 . (39)
Let us now consider the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel{(
Wt1⊗W
′
t2 , Vt1⊗V
′
t2
)
: (t1, t2) ∈ θ2
}
, where
{(
Wt1⊗W
′
t2
)
: (t1, t2) ∈ θ2
}
is
an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {(00), (01), (10), (11)} → H⊗2,
(a, a′) → Wt1(a) ⊗W
′
t2(a
′), and
{(
Vt1 ⊗ V
′
t2
)
: (t1, t2) ∈ θ2
}
is an arbitrar-
ily varying classical-quantum channel {(00), (01), (10), (11)} → H⊗2, (a, a′) →
Vt1(a)⊗ V
′
t2(a
′), if the channel state is (t1, t2).
We have
Cs
({(
Wt1 ⊗W
′
t2 , Vt1 ⊗ V
′
t2
)
: (t1, t2) ∈ θ
2
}
; r
)
≥
1
2
> 0 . (40)
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Assume
{(
Wt1 ⊗W
′
t2
)
: (t1, t2) ∈ θ2
}
is symmetrizable, then there exists a
parametrized set of distributions {τ(· | (a, a′)) : (a, a′) ∈ {(00), (01), (10), (11)}}
on θ2 such that for all (a, a′), (b, b′) ∈ {(00), (01), (10), (11)} it holds∑
(t1,t2)∈θ2
τ((t1, t2) | (b, b
′))Wt1 (a)⊗W
′
t2(a
′)
=
∑
(t1,t2)∈θ2
τ((t1, t2) | (a, a
′))Wt1(b)⊗W
′
t2(b
′) . (41)
(41) implies that∑
(t1,t2)∈θ2
τ((t1, t2) | (0, 0))Wt1(0)⊗W
′
t2(1)
=
∑
(t1,t2)∈θ2
τ((t1, t2) | (0, 1))Wt1(0)⊗W
′
t2(0)
⇒ (τ((1, 1) | (0, 0)) + τ((1, 2) | (0, 0))) |0〉〈0| ⊗
(
1
4
|0〉〈0|+
3
4
|1〉〈1|
)
+ (τ((2, 1) | (0, 0)) + τ((2, 2) | (0, 0))) |1〉〈1| ⊗
(
1
4
|0〉〈0|+
3
4
|1〉〈1|
)
= (τ((1, 1) | (0, 1)) + τ((1, 2) | (0, 1))) |0〉〈0| ⊗
(
3
4
|0〉〈0|+
1
4
|1〉〈1|
)
+ (τ((2, 1) | (0, 1)) + τ((2, 2) | (0, 1))) |1〉〈1| ⊗
(
3
4
|0〉〈0|+
1
4
|1〉〈1|
)
⇒ (τ((1, 1) | (0, 0)) + τ((1, 2) | (0, 0))) = 9 (τ((1, 1) | (0, 0)) + τ((1, 2) | (0, 0))) and
(τ((2, 1) | (0, 0)) + τ((2, 2) | (0, 0))) = 9 (τ((2, 1) | (0, 0)) + τ((2, 2) | (0, 0)))
⇒  . (42)
Therefore
{(
Wt1 ⊗W
′
t2
)
: (t1, t2) ∈ θ2
}
is not symmetrizable, and by The-
orem 3.1. 1,
Cs
({(
Wt1 ⊗W
′
t2 , Vt1 ⊗ V
′
t2
)
: (t1, t2) ∈ θ
2
})
= Cs
({(
Wt1 ⊗W
′
t2 , Vt1 ⊗ V
′
t2
)
: (t1, t2) ∈ θ
2
}
; r
)
> 0 . (43)
This example shows that although both {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ} and {(W ′t, V ′t) :
t ∈ θ} are themselves useless, they allow secure transmission using together
(“0 + 0 > 0”). Thus Theorem 5.2 is proven. This shows that the research in
quantum channels with channel uncertainty and eavesdropping can lead to some
promising applications.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied message transmission over a classical-quantum chan-
nel with both a jammer and an eavesdropper, which is called an arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. We also studied how helpful various
resources can be.
The Ahlswede dichotomy for classical arbitrarily varying channels was intro-
duced in [3]. The Ahlswede dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
channels was established in [6]. In our paper, we have generalized the result of
[15] by establishing the Ahlswede dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channels: Either the deterministic secrecy capacity of an ar-
bitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel is zero, or it equals its
randomness-assisted secrecy capacity. Interestingly, the Ahlswede dichotomy
shows that the deterministic capacity for secure message transmission is, in
general, not specified by entropy quantities. This is a new behavior in commu-
nication due to active wiretap attacks.
Dealing with channel uncertainty and eavesdropping is one of the main tasks
in modern communication systems, caused, for example, by hardware imperfec-
tion. For practical implementation, a reasonable assistance for the transmitters
is to share resources. For example, in wireless communication, the communica-
tion service may send some signals via satellite to its users. Hence, we analyzed
the secrecy capacities of various coding schemes with resource assistance. A
surprising and promising result of this paper is that the resources do not have
to be secure themselves to be helpful for secure message transmission consid-
ering channel uncertainty. Another interesting fact is that in [18], it has been
shown that the correlation is a much “cheaper” resource than randomness and
common randomness. However, the results in this paper show that for secure
message transmission considering channel uncertainty. correlation is as help-
ful as randomness and common randomness. Furthermore, a correlation (X,Y )
does not have to be “very good” to be helpful in achieving a positive secrecy
capacity, since (X,Y ) is a helpful resource even if I(X,Y ) is only slightly larger
than zero. We also gave an example that shows not only theoretically, but also
physically, how helpful a resource can be. In this example, an arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel has zero deterministic secrecy capacity, but
as soon as the sender and the receiver can use a resource, either randomness,
common randomness, or correlation, we can achieve positive secrecy capacity.
This example shows that for communication in practice, having weak public
signals will be very useful.
In [36] and [35], it has been shown that the phenomenon “super-activation”
can occur for certain quantum channels (“0 + 0 > 0”). In this paper, we have
proved that “super-activation” occurs for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channels. In classical information theory, adding a telegraph wire that
relays no information to a system does not help in the majority of cases. Our
result shows that for message transmission over classical-quantum channels with
both a jammer and an eavesdropper, adding a fiber-optic cable that relays non-
secure information can be really useful. This result sets a new challenging task
for the design of media access control, which is an important topic for standard-
ization and certification. Unlike in classical communication, for quantum media
access control, we have to consider that we can lose security if we have two
orthogonal useless arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. To
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provide security, we therefore need a more sophisticated design of media access
control than in the classical case. For example, we have to avoid two useless
channels to be orthogonal.
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